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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This appellate review proceeding arises from the Utah Labor Commission's 
November 30,2006 Order affirming the decision of the Administrative Law Judge to enter 
Petitioner's default below and the denial of Petitioner's Motion to set Aside Default. The 
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2) (a) (1953, as amended), Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-801 
(8) (1997) and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
issuej.: Did the Petitioner have a right to withdraw her Application for Hearing 
prior to Hearing? 
Standard of Review: This is a question of law where appellate review gives 
no deference to the agency's determination, because the appellate court has the 
power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the 
jurisdiction. Drake v. Industrial Commission. 939 P.2d 177,182 (Utah 1997). Such 
an Issue is reviewed for correctness. LaSal Oil Co. V. Department of Environmental 
Quality. 843 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Issue 2: Did the ALJ and the Appeals Board of the Labor Commission abuse 
their discretion in dismissing this matter with prejudice and also by failing to set aside 
Petitioner's default? 
Standard of Review: This is a question of law which is reviewed under a broad 
'abuse of discretion' standard. Sierra Club v. Utah Solid Hazardous Waste Control 
Board. 964 P.2d 335, 344 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
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Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope of the Utah 
Workers Compensation Act, it is important to recognize that the Act is to be liberally 
construed and any doubt as to compensation is to be resolved in favor of the 
Petitioner. E.g., State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission. 685 P.2d 1051, 
1053 (Utah 1984); and McPhie v. Industrial Commission. 567 P.2d 153,155 (Utah 
1977). 
Preservation for Appeal: All of the above issues were raised by Petitioner 
before the Utah Labor Commission/Utah Appeals Board. A Petition for Review was 
timely filed with this Court. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND RULE 
There is no particular "determinative" Statute or Rule, however Utah Code 
Annotated, § 63-46b-11 is applicable. Said Statute is set forth in full in Addendum 
"A" hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: The Petitioner seeks review of the Utah Labor 
Commission/Utah Appeal Board's Order affirming the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge dismissing Petitioner's Application for workers' compensation benefits with 
prejudice and the denial of Petitioner's Motion to set Aside Default. 
Course of Proceedings/Statement of Facts: The relevant facts in this matter 
are simple, straightforward and not really disputed by the parties. 
1. On January 1,2003, Petitioner sustained an industrial injury while working 
for Respondent, Shoney's Restaurant. She subsequently filed an Application for 
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Hearing with the Utah Labor Commission seeking workers' compensation benefits 
for her injuries. (R1 at 1). 
2. The ALJ assigned to hear the case set it for a half day hearing on April 26, 
2005 in St. George, Utah, where the parties and witnesses resided. (R1 at 30). 
Petitioner's counsel objected to the half day setting and requested that the Hearing 
be continued to a date when a full day setting would be available. (R1 at 31). That 
objection was denied and Petitioner's counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 
(R1 at 32). The ALJ failed to respond to the Motion for Reconsideration. 
3. On April 8,2005, a mere 18 days before Trial and well after the Motion cut 
off date in the Pre-Hearing Order, Respondent Shoney's moved to exclude 
Petitioner's vocational expertfrom testifying at the Hearing. (R1 at 61). The Motion 
was granted on April 22,2005, four days before the scheduled Hearing. (R1 at 77). 
4. Petitioner, pursuant to long-standing Labor Commission custom and 
practice, notified the ALJ that she was withdrawing her Application for Hearing and 
thus the Hearing need not be held. (R1 at 81). The ALJ again failed to respond to 
this Notice. 
5. On April 26, 2006, the ALJ commenced the evidentiary hearing and 
entered Petitioner's default. (R2). On May 4, 2005, the ALJ entered Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order of Default dismissing this matter with 
prejudice. (R1 at 83-91). 
6. On June 3,2005, Petitioner filed her Motion for Review of the ALJ's Order. 
(R1 at 92-100). On July 7,2005, the ALJ, treating Petitioner's Motion for Review as 
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a Motion to set Aside Default, entered an Order Denying Petitioner's Motion to Aside 
Default. (R1 at 136-138). 
7. On July 29, 2005, Petitioner filed a Motion for Review of Order Denying 
Motion to Set Aside Default. In said Motion, Applicant requested the Utah Labor 
Commission consolidate her prior Motion for Review filed on July 3,2005, which had 
not been ruled upon by the Commission with her July 29, 2005 Motion for Review 
of Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Default, and treat them as a single proceeding 
for the purpose of issuing an Order on Motion for Review. (R1 at 139-140). 
8. On November 30, 2006 the Utah Appeals Board entered an Order 
Affirming ALJ's Decisions. (R1 at 207-211, See also Addendum "B"). Mrs. Duran 
timely filed a Petition for Review of that Order with this Court on December 13,2006. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under long-standing Utah Labor Commission rules and practice, an Applicant 
for workers' compensation benefits has a right to withdraw his/her Application for 
Hearing at any time prior to Hearing. Petitioner simply followed and relied upon that 
custom and practice. No formal Rule of the Utah Labor Commission prohibits, limits 
or addresses this right. 
The ALJ and Utah Labor Commission failed to adequately weigh the reasons 
for Petitioner's withdraw of her Application for Hearing. There was no basis or 
justification to dismiss her Application for Hearing with prejudice and the 
Commission engaged in inadequate fact finding to support that harsh result. 
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A R G U M E N T 
I 
THE PETITIONER HAD A RIGHT TO WITHDRAW HER 
APPLICATION FOR HEARING AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO HEARING. 
A. Long Standing Commission Custom and Practice. 
The long course of practice before the Utah Labor Commission is that an 
Applicant can and on numerous times has withdrawn his/her Application for Hearing, 
without leave of the Commission. The ALJ's actions in this case are unprecedented 
and the sanction of a dismissal with prejudice is unwarranted and contrary to this 
practice. 
The Utah Labor Commission's 2002 opinion in Willard v. Thurston Cable 
Construction. Case No. 98-0569, ((copy attached hereto as Exhibit "C"), recognizes 
this practice. In Willard. the Commission staff automatically responded to the Notice 
of Withdrawal by entering a voluntary dismissal. When the Respondents in that case 
objected, the ALJ upheld the dismissal on the basis of "Commission custom 
permitting applicants to withdraw Applications for Hearing at any time...", id at 2. 
In like regard, is the Utah Labor Commission's decision in Barton v. St. 
George Steel. Case No. 97-0887 (November 29, 2000), (See copy attached as 
Addenda "D"), which interestingly involved the same counsel as the present case. 
In Barton, both the ALJ and the Commission upheld the Applicant's voluntary 
withdrawal dismissal of his Application for Hearing during the Hearing and over the 
objection of the Defendants. 
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In Willard the Commission decided to depart from that long standing custom. 
This monumental change and reversal of a long standing Commission practice and 
custom required compliance with the Utah Rule Making Act in order to properly 
announce the new practice. However, the Commission failed to initiate Rule Making. 
The Utah Appeals Board in its Order Affirming ALJ's Decision addresses none 
of these points although they were fully briefed in the parties' Memoranda. 
B. Willard v. Thurston Cable Construction. 
Both the Commission and the Respondents place a great deal of reliance on 
the Commission's 2002 opinion in Willard v. Thurston Cable Construction. Case No. 
98-0569, (July 29,2002, copy attached hereto as Exhibit "C"), for the proposition that 
an Petitioner can not unilaterally withdraw his or her Application for Hearing. 
Neither, however, responds to Petitioner's specific challenges to the application and 
relevance of the Willard decision. The ALJ does not even reference or rely upon 
Willard in her July 7, 2005 Order denying Motion to Set Aside Default. 
In Willard. the Applicant unilaterally withdrew his Application for Hearing. No 
Motion or Request for permission to Withdraw was made to the ALJ. Both the 
Commission Staff and the ALJ dismissed the Application on Motion of the Applicant 
without Prejudice. Although the Respondents subsequently filed a Motion for 
Review and the Commission on Order Granting Motion for Review/Order or Remand 
held that the unilateral dismissal was improper, they sent the case back to the ALJ 
for further review. The voluntary withdrawal and dismissal without prejudice was 
again upheld and no review was apparently sought by the Respondents. The 
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Applicant in that case subsequently refilled his Application and his case was settled. 
It does not stand for the proposition for which the Respondents have claimed. 
Second, Willard only supported a dismissal without prejudice. In sharp 
contrast in this case the ALJ dismissed the case with prejudice. Although the 
propriety of a "dismissal with prejudice" is discussed below it is important to note that 
in Willard. neither the ALJ nor the Commissioner held or even suggested a dismissal 
with prejudice was appropriate. It is also important to note that the ALJ in Willard did 
not proceed with a Hearing on the merits despite knowing that the Applicant would 
not be appearing in reliance on the Notice of Withdrawal of Application. 
Finally, the ALJ and Commission in this case failed to follow the requirements 
of the Willard decision, to the extent they are even applicable. The Commissioner 
in Willard made clear that: 
At a minimum, the ALJ should require the applicant to fully explain and 
substantiate the reasons for requesting permission to withdraw. The 
ALJ must then allow adverse parties to respond, id- at 3. 
In this case the ALJ gave no notice that she was not going to accept the 
voluntary Notice of Withdrawal. Although the record is replete with examples of 
where the ALJ responded to letters within minutes by return fax or had her 
secretary/clerk immediately contact counsel for the parties by phone to convey 
rulings, no attempt was made in this case to reach the Petitioner or her counsel by 
phone to indicate that the ALJ and opposing counsel were in St. George and that 
the ALJ was going to proceed with the Hearing and the ALJ expected them to 
appear to argue the Withdrawal of her Application for Hearing, and if necessary 
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proceed with the case. 
Although the ALJ was under no general obligation to do so, she had adopted 
that practice and knew that Petitioner's counsel was within 5 minutes of the Hearing 
location. Under the circumstances, the failure to even try to contact Petitioner's 
counsel was extremely prejudicial and has principally resulted in this situation. In 
contrast with the Willard precedent (to the extent it is any precedent), Petitioner and 
her counsel were deprived of the ability to "fully explain and substantiate the 
reasons" for the withdrawal. 
C. Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Appeals Board's reliance on Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
in Willard is misplaced. As the Board noted in that case "Rule 41 (a) [Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure] limits a plaintiff's ability to voluntarily dismiss an action to the time 
before an adverse party has filed an answer or other response." The Board went on 
to note that: 
Although the Rules of Civil Produced do not apply per se to 
administrative workers' compensation proceedings such as this, it is 
appropriate for the Commission to turn to the Rules for guidance in 
situations where no other standards are directly applicable and 
application of the Rules is not contrary to the spirit or purpose of the 
administrative proceeding, id- at 2. 
The problem with that analysis is that there are, in fact, "other standards 
directly applicable." The Administrative Procedures Act does not require a Motion, 
consent of the adverse party or the ALJ for the withdrawal of an Application for 
Hearing at any point in the proceedings. In fact, as noted by the ALJ in Willard. it is 
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a long standing "Commission custom" to permit Applicants to withdraw Applications 
for Hearing at anytime. The Commission's reliance on Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure in Willard is misplaced. 
In addition, few principles of workers compensation law are as well established 
in this State as that workers' compensation disability claims are to be liberally 
construed in favor of awarding benefits, and any doubts raised from the evidence are 
to be resolved in favor of the claim. Utah Courts have consistently reiterated this 
principle from 1919 to the present. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund. 796 P.2d 676 
(Utah 1990); J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission, 661 P.2d 949 (Utah 
1983); Prows v. Industrial Commission. 610 P.2d 1362 (Utah 1980); McPhie v. 
Industrial Commission. 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977); Baker v. Industrial Commission. 
405 P.2d 613 (Utah 1965); Askrew v. Industrial Commission. 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 
1964); M & K Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948); and 
Chandlery. Industrial Commission. 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler, supra, first discussed the proper 
construction of the Workers' Compensation Act and the underlying purposes of the 
Act, and stated as follows: 
[0]ur statute requires that the statues of this state are to be 
'liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and 
to promote justice.' 
* * * * * * 
The beneficent purpose of such acts are therefore apparent to 
all, and for that reason, if for no other, should receive a very liberal 
construction in favor of the injured employee. We are all united upon 
the proposition that in view of the purposes of such acts, in case there 
is any doubt respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should 
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be resolved in favor of the employee or his dependents as the case 
may be. id. at 1021-1022. (Emphasis added) 
The Appeals Board in rendering its Order Affirming Decision of the ALJ did 
not properly apply this vital rule of construction and the Order fails to evidence a 
"liberal construction" and "resolution of doubt in favor of the claim". 
Whenever any doubt or uncertainty appears in the record, it must be resolved 
in favor of the injured worker and the awarding of benefits. In this case doubt and 
uncertainty were construed against - rather than for - the Petitioner and her claim. 
In short, the Utah Appeals Board disregarded this fundamental principle of Utah 
Workers' Compensation law. 
II 
THE UTAH APPEALS BOARD ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING 
THIS MATTER WITH PREJUDICE AND ALSO BY FAILING TO SET ASIDE 
PETITIONER'S DEFAULT. 
There is no Statute or Rule which requires that a Withdrawal of an Application 
for Hearing be done by Motion and that such a Withdrawal, even if done mere days 
before a Hearing, is subject to denial by an ALJ. The long course of practice before 
the Labor Commission is that an Applicant can and on numerous times has 
withdrawn his/her Application for Hearing, without leave of the ALJ. The ALJ's and 
Commission's actions in this case are unprecedented and the sanction of a 
dismissal with prejudice was unwarranted and improper. 
The ALJ and Commission did not adequately weigh the reasons for 
Petitioner's withdrawal of her Application for Hearing. Little or no prejudice would 
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have occurred to the Respondents in this case had the Hearing been canceled and 
the Application dismissed without prejudice. Had the ALJ promptly ruled on the 
Withdrawal, the Petitioner would have been on notice to appear orthe Respondent's 
Counsel would have been on notice not to appear. 
The allegation that the Respondents had a witness and some plates that might 
not be available in the future is speculative at best and ludicrous at worst. There is 
no indication from the ALJ's Findings that the alleged witness even appeared at the 
Hearing. It is not so noted in the Appearances section of the decision and her 
testimony and the evidentiary value of the plates is never mentioned. 
The parties were put on Notice that Petitioner intended to reflle her Application 
for Hearing at a latter time. It defies logic and reason that so knowing, they could not 
preserve a plate and remain in contact with their sole witness. If it was reasonably 
expected that the witness would not be available in the future, her deposition could 
be taken to preserve her testimony. 
The Petitioner was severely prejudice by the ALJ not notifying the parties that 
a Hearing would be held on the Motion to Withdraw and that in the event the 
Withdrawal was not permitted, the Hearing would go ahead as scheduled. The 
Hearing that resulted in a "dismissal with prejudice" was a sham since it was 
conducted without the Petitioner even being present. 
The Commission did not make any Findings as to why the extraordinary and 
harsh remedy of a dismissal with prejudice was imposed. The Notice of Hearing 
indicates that if a party fails to appear, the "case may be dismissed or you may be 
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defaulted," but it does not state that a dismissal with prejudice may occur, at all. (R1 
at 30). 
Petitioner concedes that it may have been reasonable and proper to dismiss 
the Application without prejudice. This would have required her to reflle her case, 
if at all, within the Statute of Limitations and wait for a new Hearing date which would 
most likely be over a year away. Any Applicant withdrawing a claim would suffer the 
delay and the possibility of the loss of evidence to support his/her claim. This alone 
is a sufficient sanction to guard against frivolous withdrawals of Applications. 
Even the statute cited by the Commission (UCA § 63-46b-11) does not 
authorize a dismissal "with prejudice." Neither the Administrative Procedures Act nor 
the adopted Administrative Rules of the Labor Commission provide any support for 
a dismissal with prejudice. No cases from the Court of Appeals or the Utah 
Supreme Court authorize such an sanction. 
Indeed, the Utah Court of Appeals in Doubletree v. Industrial Commission. 797 
P.2d 464 (Utah App. 1990) held that the Commission had authority under the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act to dismiss "without" prejudice. That rational has 
subsequently been upheld in Bourgeous v. Department of Commerce. 981 P.2d 414 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1991) and Bacon v. Industrial Commission. 854 P.2d 548 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1991). 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 34A-2-420, U.C.A. specifically provides that: 
(1) (a) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case 
shall be continuing. 
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(b) After notice and hearing, the Division of Adjudication, commissioner, 
or Appeals Board in accordance with part 8, Adjudication, may from 
time to time modify or change a former finding or order of the 
Commission. 
The concept of a "dismissal with prejudice," meaning that a case can never 
again be refilled, is entirely inconsistent with the Commission's statutorily mandated 
continuing jurisdiction. 
In any event, even assuming that a "dismissal with prejudice" was permissible 
such an extreme sanction would require detailed Findings of Fact supporting that 
harsh result. In this case, both the ALJ and Commission only cite the Respondent's 
preparation time, travel expenses and the possibility that witnesses and exhibits will 
not be available in the future. Those reasons alone are not sufficient to support a 
dismissal "with prejudice". 
For all intents and purposes a dismissal without prejudice means that the 
Respondents have won. All of their preparation time and expense are born out by 
the Application being dismissed. Although it is possible for such an Application to 
be refilled, that is a risk Respondents run in every case, because of the 
Commission's continuing jurisdiction. The Respondents' travel expenses were 
minimal when weighed against the impact of a dismissal with prejudice to the 
Applicant and were partially the result of the Commission and ALJ's failure to act on 
the Notice of Withdrawal. The possibility that witnesses will be unavailable in the 
future is pure speculation and certainly could be avoided by the Respondents as 
indicated above. 
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CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Petitioner was entitled to withdraw her Application at any time prior to Hearing 
as she did in this case. Long standing Commission custom supports this practice. 
Even if it had been proper to dismiss Petitioner's Application for Hearing, it could only 
be dismissed without prejudice. No statute, rule or case law supports any other 
result. 
Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals reverse the Utah 
Appeals Board/Utah Labor Commission and direct that the case be dismissed without 
prejudice. 
DATED this 27th day of July, 2007. 
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Addendum A 
Utah Code Annotated, § 63-46b-11 (1988) 
63-46b-11 Default. 
(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of default against a party if: 
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative proceeding fails to participate in the 
adjudicative proceeding; 
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to attend or participate 
in a properly scheduled hearing after receiving proper notice; or 
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to file a response 
under Section 63-46b-6. 
(2) An order of default shall include a statement of the grounds for default and 
shall be mailed to all parties. 
(3) (a) A defaulted party may seek to have the agency set aside the default order, 
and any order in the adjudicative proceeding issued subsequent to the default 
order, by following the procedures outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(b) A motion to set aside a default and any subsequent order shall be made 
to the presiding officer. 
(c) A defaulted party may seek agency review under Section 63-46b-12 , or 
reconsideration under Section 63-46b-13 , only on the decision of the presiding 
officer on the motion to set aside the default. 
(4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the agency, or in an adjudicative 
proceeding begun by a party that has other parties besides the party in default, 
the presiding officer shall, after issuing the order of default, conduct any further 
proceedings necessary to complete the adjudicative proceeding without the 
participation of the party in default and shall determine all issues in the 
adjudicative proceeding, including those affecting the defaulting party. 
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no parties other than the agency 
and the party in default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing the order of 
default, dismiss the proceeding. 
Addendum B 
Order Affirming ALJ's Decision 
Appeals Board, Utah Labor Commission 
(November 30, 2006) 
APPEALS BOARD 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
MARIA D. DURAN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
SHONEY'S RESTAURANT and 




' Case No. 04-0077 
Maria Duran asks the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review 
Administrative Law Judge Marlowe's decisions regarding Ms. Duran's claim for benefits under the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated). 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §63-46b-12 and §34A-2-801(3). 
BACKGROUND 
Ms. Duran, through her attorney, Viginius Dabney, filed an Application For Hearing with the 
Commission. The purpose of this Application was to compel Shoney's Restaurant and its insurance 
carrier, Wasau Insurance Company (referred to jointly hereafter as "Shoney's"), to pay workers' 
compensation benefits for injuries Ms. Duran allegedly suffered while working for Shoney's on 
January 1, 2003. 
Judge Marlowe was assigned to preside over Ms. Duran's claim. Because Ms. Duran and 
Mr. Dabney reside in St. George, Utah, Judge Marlowe scheduled Ms. Duran's claim for hearing in 
St. George, to begin at 1 p.m. on April 26, 2005. Notice of the hearing was mailed to the parties on 
January 6, 2005. 
In a letter dated January 26,2005, Mr. Dabney advised Judge Marlowe that he would prefer 
that a full day be reserved for the hearing. However, Mr. Dabney also stated that "we do not want to 
give up the half-day setting if there is no full day available." Judge Marlowe's clerk responded with 
a letter dated February 7, 2005, which advised Mr. Dabney that a full day hearing slot was not 
available, but that Judge Marlowe could continue the hearing in Salt Lake City if more time were 
actually required. 
On March 11, 2005, Mr. Dabney sent another letter to Judge Marlowe. In this letter, Mr. 
Dabney stated that, because he, his client, and her witnesses all lived in St. George, it would be 
expensive and inconvenient for them to travel to Salt Lake City. On that basis, he requested that the 
half-day hearing that had already been scheduled in St. George on April 26, 2005, be continued to a 
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later date when a full day hearing could be held m St George Mr Dabney's letter contained no 
explanation for his assertion that Ms Duran's claim could not be heard m the half day that had 
already been allotted 
Judge Marlowe responded by letter to Mr Dabney on March 16,2005 She advised that the 
hearing would go forward on April 26, 2005 She also advised that, if more time was required to 
complete the hearing, an additional hearing could be held m either St George or Salt Lake City In 
yet another letter, also dated March 16, 2005, Mr Dabney asked Judge Marlowe to reconsider 
Having already denied Mr Dabney's request for continuance, Judge Marlowe did not respond to Mr 
Dabney's request that she reconsider The hearing remained scheduled for April 26,2005, at 1 p m 
On April 8, 2005, Shoney's moved to exclude Ms Duran's vocational expert, Kenneth 
Lister, from testifying at the upcoming hearing After allowing time for Ms Duran to respond, and 
her failure to do so, Judge Marlowe granted the motion on Friday, April 22, 2005 On Monday, 
April 25,2005, at 2 30 p m , Mr Dabney faxed a letter to Judge Marlowe's office m Salt Lake City 
purporting to withdraw Ms Duran's Application For Hearing and stating that neither he nor Ms 
Duran would attend the hearing scheduled for the next day By the time Mr Dabney sent this letter, 
Judge Marlowe had already left for St George Mr Dabney did not provide a copy of the letter to 
Shoney's attorney, who flew to St George the morning of Tuesday, April 26, 2005, to attend the 
hearing Judge Marlowe learned of Mr Dabney's attempt to withdraw Ms Duran's application ma 
telephone call from her clerk on Tuesday morning 
At 1 p m on Tuesday, April 26, 2005, Judge Marlowe commenced the evidentiary hearing 
that had been scheduled on Ms Duran's claim Shoney's attorney and witness were present Ms 
Duran and Mr Dabney were absent Judge Marlowe entered Ms Duran's default and then 
proceeded with the hearing On May 3, 2005, Judge Marlowe issued her decision confirming Ms 
Duran's default and concluding that Ms Duran had failed to establish that she was entitled to the 
workers' compensation benefits she had requested Judge Marlowe therefore denied Ms Duran's 
claim with prejudice Judge Marlowe appended to her decision a statement of the procedures 
available for Ms Duran to request relief from her default, as well as a statement of Ms Duran's 
appeal rights This statement of appeal rights specifically ad\ised that any appeal must be filed 
withm 30 days from the date Judge Marlowe signed her decision 
On June 3, 2005, 31 days after Judge Marlowe signed her decision, Mr Dabney filed a 
motion for review of the decision on behalf of Ms Duran The motion for review included three 
arguments 1) Ms Duran had an unconditional right to withdraw her application at any time prior to 
the hearing, 2) Judge Marlowe's failure to immediately act on Mr Dabney's letter of April 25,2005, 
purporting to withdraw Ms Duran's application, had led Mr Dabney and Ms Duran to believe they 
need not appear at the hearing the following day, and 3) Judge Marlowe's dismissal of Ms Duran's 
claim with prejudice was unwarranted 
Judge Marlowe treated the foregoing motion as a request that Ms Duran be relieved from her 
default On July 7, 2005, Judge Marlowe issued her second decision in this matter, which decision 
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rejected her request to set aside Ms. Duran's default. On August 1, 2005, Mr. Dabney submitted a 
motion for review of Judge Marlowe's second decision. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Although Mr. Dabney has submitted two documents labeled as "motions for review," Judge 
Marlowe properly treated the first of those motions as a request that she relieve Ms. Duran from her 
default. On July 7,2005, Judge Marlowe issued her decision denying the request, and Mr. Dabney 
filed a timely request for review. Consequently, the issue now before the Appeals Board is whether 
Judge Marlowe properly denied Ms. Duran's request for relief from default. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Section 63-46b-l 1(1) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA") authorizes an 
administrative law judge to "enter an order of default against a party if. . . [that] party to a formal 
adjudicative proceeding fails to attend or participate in a properly scheduled hearing after receiving 
proper notice." The record in this matter clearly establishes that the hearing on Ms. Duran's claim 
was properly scheduled for April 26,2005, at 1 p.m. The record also establishes that Ms. Duran and 
her attorney, Mr. Dabney, received proper notice of the hearing. Nevertheless, Ms. Duran and Mr, 
Dabney failed to attend or participate. Under these circumstances, it was appropriate for Judge 
Marlowe to enter Ms. Duran's default. 
After an order of default is entered, § 63-46b-11 (3)(a) of UAPA allows the defaulted party to 
ask the administrative law judge to set aside the default pursuant to the procedures established by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. These procedures, found in Rule 55, U.R.C.P. and, by reference, in 
Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., provide that a party's default may be set aside for "good cause shown," such 
as mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, or other similar 
reasons. Judge Marlowe concluded that none of these reasons was present in this case so as to 
warrant relieving Ms. Duran from default. 
Ms. Duran now challenges Judge Marlowe's refusal to set aside Ms. Duran's default by 
arguing that Ms. Duran had an unconditional right to withdraw her application at any time prior to 
the actual hearing. According to this argument, Mr. Dabney's letter of Monday, April 25,2005, was 
sufficient to withdraw Ms. Duran's application. Consequently, when Judge Marlowe convened the 
evidentiary hearing the next day, on Tuesday, April 26, 2005, there was no claim to be adjudicated 
and Ms. Duran could not be in default for failing to appear. 
The Utah Labor Commissioner has previously considered and rejected this same argument in 
Willard v. Thurston Cable Construction (Case No. 98-0560; decided July 29, 2002). There, the 
Commissioner concluded that Rule 41, U.R.C.P., although not directly applicable in the Labor 
Commission's adjudicative proceedings, provided useful guidance by analogy. On that basis, the 
Commissioner concluded that, after a respondent has filed an answer to an application, the 
administrative law judge's permission is required before an applicant may withdraw the application. 
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The Appeals Board concurs with this reasoning and, on that basis, rejects Ms. Duran's assertion that 
she had an absolute right to withdraw her application in this matter. 
Next, Ms. Duran argues that Judge Marlowe's "failure" to immediately act on Ms. Duran's 
purported withdrawal of her Application For Hearing misled Mr. Dabney and Ms. Duran into 
believing that the hearing would not be held and that they need not appear. The Appeals Board finds 
no merit to this argument. Mr. Dabney had received notice of the hearing. He had received nothing 
that countermanded that hearing notice. Under these circumstances, it was his clear obligation to 
appear at the hearing with his client. 
Finally, Ms. Durant contends that dismissal of her claim "with prejudice" was unwarranted. 
The Appeals Board disagrees. Ms. Duran's claim was scheduled for hearing on the merits. Ms. 
Duran had every opportunity to appear at that hearing and present evidence to support her claim. 
She and her attorney chose not to avail themselves of this opportunity. However, Shoney's did 
appear and did present evidence. Based on the resulting hearing record, Judge Marlowe made a 
determination on the merits and concluded that Ms. Duran was not entitled to benefits. It was 
therefore proper to dismiss her claim with prejudice. 
In summary, the Appeals Board concludes that Judge Marlowe properly entered Ms. Duran's 
default and dismissed her claim with prejudice. Judge Marlowe also properly declined to relieve 
Ms. Duran from her default. 
ORDER 
The Appeals Board affirms Judge Marlowe's order denying Ms. Duran's motion to set aside 
default. It is so ordered. 
Dated this
 v jQ day of November, 2006. 
olleen S. Colton, Chair 
^rv 
HJJA^ S>/£bau>^ 
Patricia S. Drawe 
IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE. 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this 
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days 
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals 
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the 
court within 30 days of the date of this order. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Affirming ALJ's Decisions in the matter of Maria 
D Duran 04-0077, was mailed first class postage prepaid this ^ T ^ a y of November, 2006, to the 
following: 
Maria D Duran 
2300 E Middleton Dr #29 
St George UT 84770 
Shoneys Restaurant 
1410 E St George Blvd 
St George UT 84770 
Virginius Dabney Esq 
1060SMainStSte2 
St George UT 84770 
Michael E Dyer Esq 
257 E 200 S Ste 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Sara Danielson 
Utah Labor Commission 
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Addendum C 
Willard v. Thurston Cable Construction 
Utah Labor Commission 
Case No. 98-0569 
(July 29, 2002) 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION . . . . . . . . , 
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DALE T. WILLARD, 
* ORDER GRANTING 
Applicant, * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* * « 
v. * ORDER OF REMAND 
THURSTON CABLE CONSTRUCTION * 
and FREMONT COMP., * Case No. 98-0569 
* 
Defendants. * 
Thurston Cable Construction and its workers compensation insurance carrier, Fremont Comp. 
(referred to jointly as "Thurston") ask the Utah Labor Commission to review the Administrative Law 
Judge's dismissal without prejudice of Dale T. Willard's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED 
Mr. Willard filed an Application For Hearing with the Commission on July 9,1998, claiming 
workers' compensation benefits from Thurston for a work-related injury that had occurred on 
February 18, 1994. Thurston filed an Answer to Mr. Willard's claim and the parties engaged in 
substantial pre-hearing preparation and negotiation. On June 21,2000, Judge S witzer conducted an 
evidentiary hearing on Mr. Willard's claim, then issued a preliminary Order referring the medical 
aspects of the claim to a medical panel. 
Mr. Willard filed objections to Judge Switzer's preliminary Order. At about the same time, 
Judge Switzer left her position with the Commission and Mr. Willard's claim was reassigned to 
Judge George. Because the recording of the first evidentiary hearing had been lost, Judge George 
scheduled a second evidentiary hearing. The hearing was rescheduled several times and the parties 
again engaged in substantial pre-hearing preparation. Then, before the second hearing could be held, 
Mr. Willard filed a "Withdrawal Of Application For Hearing Without Prejudice" purporting to 
withdraw his Application For Hearing on the grounds he was "currently incarcerated and cannot fully 
cooperate in the discovery process." 
Apparently at Judge George's direction, but without any opportunity for Thurston to respond, 
Commission support staff issued a Notice canceling the upcoming hearing. The Notice included the 
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statement that "Per Petitioner's 2/14/2002 withdrawal of Application For Hearing*(attadMdJ/tiiis " * 
matter is hereby dismissed without prejudice." 
• * 
» * 
Thurston immediately filed a written objection to the dismissal. In a fax dated Februafy 25, 
2002, Judge George reaffirmed the dismissal without prejudice of Mr. Willard's claim. Ju<Sge 
George based the dismissal on a "Commission custom" permitting applicants to withdraw 
Applications for Hearing at any time and a perfunctory finding of good cause to allow Mr. Willard 
to withdraw his claim. 
Thurston now asks the Commission to review this matter. Although Thurston raises a 
variety of issues, the Commission believes two questions are dispositive. First, is Commission 
permission required before Mr. Willard may withdraw his Application For Hearing? If so, under the 
facts of this case, should permission to withdraw be granted? 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
In Doubletree v. Industrial Commission, 797 P.2d 464 (Utah App. 1990), the Utah Court of 
\ppeals held that the Commission has authority under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
"UAPA"; Title 63, Chapter 46b, Utah Code Annotated) to dismiss Applications For Hearing 
without prejudice. In Doubletree and its companion cases, the Commission used its authority to 
lismiss as a sanction against applicants who failed to cooperate with the adjudicative process. Here, 
he situation is somewhat different. It is Mr. Willard himself, rather than the Commission, who 
;eeks to terminate this adjudicative proceeding. 
The parties have not identified any provision of statute or any appellate decision that 
Lddresses the specific question of whether an applicant in a workers' compensation adjudicative 
jroceeding may, as a matter of right, withdraw his or her Application. However, Thurston points 
>ut that Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure addresses the issue in the analogous context 
>f litigation in Utah's civil courts. Although the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply per se to 
.dministrative workers' compensation proceedings such as this, it is appropriate for the Commission 
o turn to the Rules for guidance in situations where no other standards are directly applicable and 
pplication of the Rules is not contrary to the spirit or purpose of the administrative proceeding. 
Rule 41(a) limits a plaintiffs ability to voluntarily dismiss an action to the time before any 
dverse party has filed an answer or other response. In this case, Thurston long ago filed its Answer 
3 Mr. Willard's Application. Consequently, Mr. Willard would have no automatic right under Rule 
1(a) to withdraw his Application. 
Rule 41(b) provides that in cases where an Answer has already been filed, "an action may 
nly be dismissed . . . based either on: (i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have appeared in the 
ction; or (ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper " Furthermore, "Rule 
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41(a)(2), U.R.C.P., invests the court with a reasonable discretion in the matter of dismissals." 
Murray First Thrift & Loan Co. v. Benson, 563 P.2d 185 (Utah 1977). 
In view of the foregoing provisions of Rule 41, and in the absence of an£ stipulation for 
dismissal between the parties, the Commission concludes that Commission permission is required 
before Mr. Willard may withdraw his Application For Hearing in this matter. 
The remaining question is under what circumstances permission to withdraw an Application 
should be given. It is impossible to foresee all possible permutations of this question. For that 
reason, ALJs must have reasonable discretion to consider the particular facts and circumstances of 
each request. At a minimum, the ALJ should require the applicant to fully explain and substantiate 
the reasons for requesting permission to withdraw. The ALJ must then allow adverse parties to 
respond. With the information so obtained, the ALJ should weigh the reasons for withdrawal against 
the delay, expense and duplication of effort that withdrawal would entail. The ALJ should also 
carefully consider whether some other course of proceeding might satisfy the legitimate needs of the 
parties while allowing the adjudicative process to go forward. The items identified herein for 
consideration are illustrative rather than exhaustive; other relevant items may also exist and should 
be considered. The ALJ should then issue a decision sufficient to allow further agency review as 
appropriate. 
Because the foregoing procedures were not followed with respect to Mr. Willard's 
withdrawal of his Application, the Commission finds it necessary to remand this matter to the ALJ. 
After allowing Mr. Willard to submit explanation and substantiation of his reasons for requesting 
withdrawal and providing Thurston an opportunity to respond, the ALJ will weigh the relevant 
considerations, evaluate possible alternative methods for proceeding, then issue his decision. 
ORDER 
The Commission grants Thurston's motion for review and remands this matter to the ALJ 
for further proceedings consistent with this decision. It is so ordered. 
Dated this ^ day of July, 2002. 
"' R. Lee Ellertson 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
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CERTDJICATE OF MAILING ; \ 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Granting Motion For Review/Order Of Remand 
in the matter of Dale T. Willard, Case No. 98-0569, was mailed first class postage prepaid this 
jXfday of July, 2002, to the following: 
DALE T. WILLARD 
176 W 615 N 
LAVERKIN UT 84745 
THURSTON CABLE CONSTRUCTION 
148 WEST INDUSTRIAL RD 
WASHINGTON UT 84780 
FREMONT COMP. 
PO BOX 70015 
BOISE ID 83707 
AARON J PRISBREY, ATTORNEY 
1071 E 100 S BLDG D STE 3S 
ST GEORGE UT 84770 
HENRY K CHAL, ATTORNEY 
77 WEST 200 SOUTH #400 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
Sara Danielson 
Support Specialist 
Utah Labor Commission 
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Addendum D 
Barton v. St. George Steel Fabrication 
Utah Labor Commission 
Case No. 97-0887 
(November 29, 2000) 
Utah Labor Commission 
Adjudication Division 
Case No. 97887 
t t £ f- * t * 
JOHNCBARTON * V V V - : * v v 
* Petitioner, 
* 
vs. * ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
* 
ST GEORGE STEEL FABRICATION 
and/or LIBERTY MUTUAL INS CO 
Respondents. * 
The above captioned matter having been duly considered, and it having been 
determined that: 
"This matter is dismissed without prejudice as Mr. Barton withdrew 
his application on the record before presentation of further evidence 
at the beginning of the hearing set for May 27, 2000 at 9:00, claiming 
that he was not prepared to proceed on the rehabilitation aspects of 
his claim at this time, nor would he be for several months. The 
matter may be re-opened by letter to the Judge, with supporting 
documentation, rather than filing a new application." 
And it appearing that the foregoing constitutes good cause for dismissing the claim, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the claim of the Petitioner be, and the same 
is hereby, dismissed without prejudice. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the 
Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set 
forth the specific basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 
days from the date this decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their Re-
sponses to the Motion for Review within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission 
conduct the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for 
Review or its Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the 
Appeals Board, the review will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner. 
DATED THIS May 2, 2000. 
UTAhLLABOR COMMISSION 
Donald L. George 
Administrative Law Judge 
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* Case No. 97-0887 
St. George Steel Fabrication and its workers compensation insurance carrier, Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Company, (jointly referred to as "St. George Steel") ask the Utah Labor Commission to 
review the Administrative Law Judge's refusal to impose sanctions against Virginius Dabney, the 
attorney representing John C. Barton in his claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation 
Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Does the Labor Commission have authority to impose the sanctions sought by St. George 
Steel? 
BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION 
On November 5, 1997, Mr. Barton filed an application for workers' compensation benefits 
for injuries allegedly arising from a work-related accident at St. George Steel on October 28, 1994. 
After various adjudicative proceedings, including an evidentiary hearing in St. George during 
September 1999, a second hearing was scheduled in St. George on April 27, 2000. 
The ALJ and St. George Steel intended that the second hearing would address Mr. Barton's 
rehabilitation. Mr. Barton and Mr. Dabney believed the second hearing was a continuation of the 
first hearing and would address the cause, extent and effect of Mr. Barton's work-related injuries. 
When the second hearing began, and faced with the confusion regarding the purpose of the hearing, 
Mr. Dabney asked to withdraw Mr. Barton's application, subject to refiling at a later date. The ALJ 
granted the request and dismissed Mr. Barton's application "without prejudice." 
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St. George Steel then asked the ALJ to impose sanctions against Mr. Dabney by requiring 
him to reimburse St. George Steel for expenses incurred in appearing at the secondjiearing. The 
ALJ denied St. George Steel's request f6r sanctions. St. George Steel tljen filejf its motion for 
review with the Commission and renewed its request for sanctions against "Met Da6®ey. 
Before the Commission can consider whether sanctions are warranted, it must determine 
whether it has authority to impose sanctions. St. George Steel contends the Commission has such 
authority under the provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration and the Commission's inherent authority. 
Utah's appellate courts have already ruled that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
apply wholesale to administrative proceedings. Rather, the Rules of Civil Procedure apply only 
when incorporated by some other governing statute or regulation. Beaver County v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 916 P.2d 344, 352 (Utah 1996). By extension, the same principle is true with respect 
to the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. The Commission is unaware of any statute or rule that 
incorporates into the workers' compensation system the provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure 
or Code of Judicial Administration authorizing sanctions.1 
St. George Steel also argues that the Commission has "inherent" authority to impose 
sanctions. The Commission disagrees. The Labor Commission is a creature of statute; it has only 
such jurisdiction and authority as has been conferred by the Utah Legislature. As the Utah Court of 
Appeals stated in Be vans v. Industrial Commission, 790 P.2d 573, 576 (Utah App. 1990): 
. . . the Industrial Commission (predecessor to the Labor Commission) remains a 
statutorily-created agency, not a court of equity. As such, the Industrial Commission 
has only those powers expressly or impliedly granted to it by the legislature. (Citation 
omitted.)" 
The powers which the Legislature have granted to the Commission do not include the authority to 
imposition monetary sanctions under the circumstances of this case.2 
1
 St. George Steel cites an ALJ's decision in another unrelated case as authority to 
impose sanctions. However, neither the Commission nor the Appeals Board reviewed the ALJ's 
action in the cited case. The Commission does not endorse the ALJ's action in that case. 
Furthermore, the cited case has no precedential value. 
2
 Section §63-46b-8 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, applicable to workers' 
compensation proceedings, authorizes a presiding officer to take "appropriate measures necessary 
to preserve the integrity of the hearing. This provision provides sufficient authority, short of 
penalties, to prevent overreaching, delaying tactics or other improper conduct by a party. 
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In summary, the Commission concludes that neither the Utah Rules of CiviTProcedure,*the 
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, nor "inherent" powers allow the Commission to impose the 
sanctions requested by St. George Steel against Mr. Dabney. i
 f
 f # 
* • 
ORDER 
The Commission affirms the Order of the ALJ and denies St. George Steel's motion for 
review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this x7 day of November, 2000. 
R. Lee Ellertson 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days 
of the date of this order. 
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